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ARBITRATION CLAUSES – DIFFERENCES IN PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENTS AND OPERATING AGREEMENTS
Kramlich v. Hale
In Kramlich v. Hale,1 both parties, Gary and Glory Kramlich and Robert and Susan Hale, appealed an order to submit their disputes to arbitration
from the district court.2 The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that
arbitration was in error where one contract between the parties did not explicitly approve for arbitration, even though a related contract provided for
binding arbitration, if the arbitration provision applies only to issues arising
from the one contract.3
In Minot, North Dakota, Somerset–Minot, LLC operated an assisted
living facility, which was owned by Somerset Court Partnership.4 The
Kramlichs and the Hales were members of that partnership.5 Gary
Kramlich and Robert Hale were members of that Limited Liability Corporation (“LLC”), but Glory Kramlich and Susan Hale were not members.6 The
operating agreement for the LLC contained an arbitration clause, but the
partnership agreement for the partnership did not.7
Several issues arose between the Hales and the Kramlichs, coming
from both the partnership agreement and the operating agreement. Beginning with the Hales’ attempt to buy the Kramlichs’ interest in both Somerset–Minot, LLC and Somerset Court Partnership.8 Thereafter, the
Kramlichs denied the offers and brought this action.9 The Kramlichs
brought the lawsuit against the Hales, the partnership, the LLC, and other
entities, who were not parties to this appeal.10 The Kramlichs’ complaint
alleged breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation, “attempt at purchase,” embezzlement and fraud, “failure of equal distribution,” “misrepresentation in corporate documents,” among other claims.11
Based on the broad arbitration provision in the LLC operating agreement, Ward County District Judge, Douglas L. Mattson, dismissed the ac-

1. 2017 ND 204, 901 N.W.2d 72.
2. Kramlich, ¶ 1, 901 N.W.2d at 74.
3. Id. ¶ 14, 901 N.W.2d at 78.
4. Id. ¶ 2, 901 N.W.2d at 74.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Kramlich, ¶ 3, 901 N.W.2d at 74.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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tion and ordered the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration.12 The
district court found that the complaint was not clear.13 The plaintiffs did
not clearly identify which defendant had violated which claim.14 Furthermore, Judge Mattson found that the arbitration provision as binding because
of North Dakota’s strong policy of favoring the arbitration process.15 Accordingly, Judge Mattson held that arbitration was appropriate to sort out
the issues that arose from both the LLC and the partnership.16
This case presented an issue of first impression for the North Dakota
Supreme Court; namely, “whether an arbitration clause in one agreement
may be applied to disputes arising under another agreement that lacks an
arbitration clause . . . .”17 On appeal, the Kramlichs argued that because the
partnership agreement did not contain an arbitration provision, the law did
not support the district court’s determination that arbitration was appropriate for issues arising from the partnership agreement.18 The Court noted
that several jurisdictions already had an answer for the question the Court
was answering: Colorado,19 Florida,20 Kansas,21 New Mexico,22 Oklahoma,23 the Second Circuit,24 the Tenth Circuit,25 the Eleventh Circuit,26 and a
treatise pointing the court to conclude that in this instance, the arbitration
provision applies to issues arising out of both related agreements.27 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that North Dakota already had the foundation to answer such an issue.28 The Court recognized
12. Id. ¶ 4. The operating agreement stated that “Any dispute, claim, or controversy arising
out of or relating to this agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the then current rules of the American Arbitration Association.” Id.
13. Id. ¶ 5, 901 N.W.2d at 75.
14. Kramlich, ¶ 5, 901 N.W.2d at 75.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. ¶ 8.
18. Id. ¶ 6.
19. Breaker v. Corrosion Control Corp., 23 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
20. Teel v. Aaron’s, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-640-J-32PDB, 2015 WL 1346846, at *5 (Dist. Ct.
M.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2015).
21. Consol. Brokers Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Pan–Am. Assurance Co., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 1074,
1083 (D. Kan. 2006).
22. Santa Fe Tech., Inc. v. Argus Networks, Inc., 131 N.M. 772, 42 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2001).
23. Wilkinson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 933 P.2d 878, 879 (Okla. 1997).
24. Assoc. Brick Mason Contractors of Greater New York, Inc. v. Harrington, 820 F.2d 31,
35–36 (2d Cir. 1987).
25. ARW Expl. Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1458 (10th Cir. 1995).
26. Blinco v. Green Tree Serv., LLC, 400 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2005); Seaboard Coast
Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343, 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 1982).
27. 4 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 140:3 (3d ed. 2016).
28. Kramlich, ¶ 13, 901 N.W.2d at 77 (citing 26th Street Hosp., LLP v. Real Builders, Inc.,
2016 ND 95, ¶ 27, 879 N.W.2d 437, 447) (“Background principles of state contract law control
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that North Dakota law acknowledged “a strong state and federal policy favoring the arbitration process, and . . . resolve[s] any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues in favor of arbitration when there is a broad arbitration clause and no limitations or exclusions.”29
Even though the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Judge
Mattson that the issues arising out of the partnership agreement and the operating agreement were interrelated, the Court placed more emphasis on the
“this agreement” language of the operating agreement than the district
court.30 The Court’s reasoning was distinguishable from the broad provision in 26th Street Hosp., LLP v. Real Builders, Inc.31 because even though
the Somerset–Minot, LLC operating agreement was found to be broad by
the district court, the plain meaning did not support expanding its language
to encompass other contracts.32 Furthermore, the Somerset Court Partnership agreement was executed almost fourteen months after the operating
agreement was executed.33 Therefore, there was no argument that could be
sustained claiming that the two contracts arose from the same agreement.34
Finally, Glory Kramlich and Susan Hale were not parties to the operating
agreement, but were parties to the partnership agreement.35 Therefore, the
parties to each contract were not identical and did not support a finding that
the arbitration provision should be binding on individuals who did not agree
to be bound by such a provision.36 Accordingly, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the district court erred as a matter of law when it ordered arbitration of the issues arising from the partnership agreement.37
The North Dakota Supreme Court also addressed the issue of which
law applied to the arbitration provision.38 North Dakota usually allows for
the judiciary to decide whether an issue is one for arbitration.39 In this case,
however, the operating agreement required arbitration to be conducted unthe interpretation of the scope of an arbitration agreement, including who is bound by the agreement.”).
29. Id. (quoting Real Builders, ¶ 21, 879 N.W.2d 437); see also Schwarz v. Gierke, 2010 ND
166, ¶ 11, 788 N.W.2d 302, 306.
30. Kramlich, ¶ 14, 901 N.W.2d at 77 (the operating agreement stated that the arbitration
provision applied to “[a]ny dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach thereof.” (Emphasis added.)).
31. 2016 ND 95, 879 N.W.2d 437.
32. Kramlich, ¶ 14, 901 N.W.2d at 78.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Kramlich, ¶ 15, 901 N.W.2d at 78.
39. Id. (citing Real Builders, ¶ 23, 879 N.W.2d 437; Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
537 U.S. 79, 83, 123 S. Ct. 588, 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002)).

2018]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

455

der the rules of the American Arbitration Association.40 The rules of the
American Arbitration Association stated that the arbitrator had the authority
to rule on such matters.41 Therefore, instead of the district judge deciding
which issues were appropriate for arbitration, that determination was for the
arbitrator to decide.42 After the arbitrator determines which issues arose
from the operating agreement, the district court will decide the remaining
issues.43
The Kramlichs also argued that by ordering arbitration, the district
court violated their right to a jury trial.44 However, in North Dakota, an individual can waive her right to a jury trial.45 By signing the operating
agreement, Gary Kramlich waived his right to a jury trial, and Glory
Kramlich waived her right to a jury trial by pursuing a claim under her husband’s rights granted by the operating agreement.46 Therefore, the
Kramlichs’ argument regarding their right to a jury trial was without merit.47
In their cross-appeal, the Hales argued that the district court should
have dismissed the lawsuit as moot because the Hales withdrew the offer to
buy the Kramlichs’ interest in the partnership and in the LLC.48 Even
though the general rule is that courts may adjudicate actual controversies
before a court, no actual controversy exists if the issue has become moot.49
In this case, the alleged causes of action were broad enough to survive the
withdrawal of the offer.50 Accordingly, the lawsuit was not moot.51
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court where the
district court ordered arbitration of the issues that arose from the Somerset–
Minot, LLC’s operating agreement, but reversed the district court’s order
for arbitration of the issues that arose from the Somerset Court Partnership
agreement.52 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court remanded the
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting Real Builders, at ¶ 24).
42. Id.
43. Id. ¶ 16 (citing Real Builders, ¶¶ 5–6, 879 N.W.2d 437 (affirming stay of “anything that
cannot be arbitrated . . . pending the ordered arbitration.”)).
44. Kramlich, ¶ 18, 901 N.W.2d at 78.
45. Id. ¶ 19; R.J. Griffin & Co. v. Beach Club II Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 384 F.3d 157, 164
(4th Cir. 2004) (“A party may, of course, waive the jury trial right by signing an agreement to arbitrate or by binding itself to arbitration as a nonsignatory through traditional principles of contract or agency law.”); see also Uniform Arbitration Act (2000) § 6 cmt. 7, 7 U.L.A. 30 (2009).
46. Kramlich, ¶ 19, 901 N.W.2d at 78.
47. Id.
48. Id. ¶ 20, 901 N.W.2d at 79.
49. Id. ¶ 21 (citing Interest of W.O., 2004 ND 8, ¶ 10, 673 N.W.2d 264).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Kramlich, ¶ 22, 901 N.W.2d at 79.
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case to the district court. 53 The North Dakota Supreme Court instructed the
district court to wait until the arbitrator determined which issues arose from
the operating agreement, and are therefore arbitrable, and which issues
arose from the partnership agreement, and are not arbitrable. 54 The district
court could then resolve the remaining issues.55

53. Id. (citing Real Builders, ¶¶ 5–6, 879 N.W.2d 437; Breaker, 23 P.3d at 1286).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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CONTRACTS– FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES & NON-COMPETE
AGREEMENTS
Osborne v. Brown & Saenger, Inc.
In Osborne v. Brown & Saenger, Inc.,56 Dawn Osborne (Osborne) appealed from a district court order granting Brown & Saenger, Inc.’s
(Brown) motion to dismiss for improper venue.57 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the forum-selection
clause in the parties’ employment agreement violated North Dakota’s public policy against non-compete agreements, and held the non-compete
clause unenforceable to the extent it limits Osborne from exercising a lawful business in North Dakota.58
Brown is headquartered in South Dakota and operates as a foreign
business corporation in North Dakota.59 In 2011, Brown hired Osborne as a
sales representative to sell office supplies to businesses.60 Osborne signed
yearly employment contracts with Brown,61 and in January 2017, Brown
terminated Osborne.62
Osborne sued Brown, “alleging retaliation, improper deductions, and
breach of contract.”63 Additionally, Osborne sought a declaratory judgment
declaring the non-compete clause void and moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Brown from enforcing the non-compete clause against her.64
Brown moved to dismiss the action for improper venue arguing the forumselection clause in the employment agreement was valid, thus, making a
North Dakota court an improper venue.65 The parties agreed Osborne’s
2015 Employment Agreement was the controlling contract in this action.66
The district court agreed with Brown and granted the motion to dismiss, without ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction.67 In addition
to the present claim in North Dakota, Brown filed suit against Osborne in

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

2017 ND 288, 904 N.W.2d 34.
Id. ¶ 1, 904 N.W.2d at 35.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Osborne, ¶ 4, 904 N.W.2d at 36.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2, 904 N.W.2d at 35.
Id. ¶ 4, 904 N.W.2d at 36.
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Minnehaha County, South Dakota, seeking a preliminary injunction to restrict Osborne’s actions under the non-compete clause.68
There are two clauses at issue in deciding Brown’s motion to dismiss –
the non-compete clause and the choice of forum clause.69 The non-compete
clause states, in relevant part:
[E]mployee agrees not to engage directly or indirectly, either personally or as an employee, associate, partner, or otherwise, or by
means of any corporation or other legal entity, or otherwise, in any
business in competition with Employer and, in addition, not to solicit customers of Employer for Employee’s own benefit or for the
benefit of any third party, during the term of employment and for a
period of two (2) years from the last day of employment, within a
100 mile radius of employment location.70
The second clause at issue is the “Choice of Law/Forum” clause.71 The
clause provides:
The parties agree that this agreement is governed by the laws of
the State of South Dakota and that the state circuit court situated in
Minnehaha County, South Dakota, shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of any disputes relating to this Agreement.72
The North Dakota Supreme Court has not previously addressed the
standard of review of a district court’s granting of Rule 12(b)(3)73 motion
on the basis of a forum-selection clause.74 Because Rule 12 is derived from
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court viewed the federal interpretations of Rule 12(b)(3) as highly persuasive authority.75 In adopting a de
novo review, the Court noted that the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have determined de novo is the proper standard for reviewing
a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss on the basis of a forum selection clause.76

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Osborne, ¶ 5, 904 N.W.2d at 37.
Id. ¶ 3., 904 N.W.2d at 35-36.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id.
N.D. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3).
Osborne, ¶ 6, 904 N.W.2d at 36.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7, 904 N.W.2d at 36-37.
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Osborne argued the district court erred in granting Brown’s motion to
dismiss for improper venue because the selection of a foreign forum would
be unreasonable and the forum-selection clause is unenforceable under
North Dakota law.77 Where the parties have agreed in writing that an action
may only be brought in another state and it is brought in a court of this
state, the court will only dismiss the action if it is unfair or unreasonable to
enforce the agreement.78 Moreover, a forum-selection clause “may be set
aside if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum
in which suit is brought.”79
Osborne argued that enforcing the forum-selection clause would allow
Brown to violate North Dakota’s strong public policy against non-compete
agreements.80 The North Dakota Supreme Court looked to § 9-08-06 which
provided a statutory standard for non-compete agreements.81 The Century
Code provides, in relevant part: “Every contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind
is to that extent void . . . .”82 Further, it was Osborne’s contention that a
South Dakota court would apply its own law, generally permitting noncompete agreements, allowing Brown to circumvent Section § 9-08-06
while utilizing the forum selection clause.83
In determining that enforcing the forum-selection clause would permit
§ 9-08-06 to be circumvented, the Court noted that the employment contract
had a choice-of-law provision requiring South Dakota law to be used.84
Since South Dakota law permits limited covenants-not-to-compete, the
Court noted a 2012 case in which the Minnehaha County Circuit Court in
South Dakota granted Brown a preliminary injunction against another of its
former North Dakota employees, essentially circumventing § 9-08-06.85 As
North Dakota case law demonstrates a strong public policy against noncompete agreements, the Court held covenants-not-to-compete against public policy.86

77. Id. ¶ 8, 904 N.W.2d at 37.
78. Id. ¶ 9 (citations omitted).
79. Id. (citing Servewell Plumbing, LLC v. Federal Ins. Co., 439 F 3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.
2006) (quotations omitted)).
80. Osborne, ¶ 10, 904 N.W.2d at 37.
81. Id.
82. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06.
83. Osborne, ¶ 11, 904 N.W.2d at 37.
84. Id. ¶ 12.
85. Id. at 37-38.
86. Id. ¶ 13, 904 N.W.2d at 38.
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Furthermore, § 28-04.1-03(5) “prevents enforcement of a forumselection clause if enforcement would be unfair or unreasonable . . . .”87 In
determining enforcement of the forum-selection clause would be unfair and
unreasonable, the Court reasoned enforcement would “facilitate enforcement of the non-compete clause in a foreign court to restrain competition”
by North Dakota people in the state of North Dakota.88 Further, “another
state’s forum applying that state’s law to the non-compete clause would
violate North Dakota’s public policy against non-compete agreements.”89
Thus, the Court determined the forum-selection clause is “unenforceable
because the non-compete clause is unenforceable.”90
Because North Dakota has an interest in protecting its strong public
policy against non-compete agreements from evasion, the Court held the
Choice of Law/Forum clause unenforceable.91 In addition, the Court held
that the non-compete clause is unenforceable under § 9-08-06 to the extent
it limits Osborne from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business in
North Dakota.92 In holding the two clauses unenforceable, the Court reversed the district court’s order granting Brown’s motion to dismiss and
remanded for further proceedings.93

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. ¶ 14.
Id.
Osborne, ¶ 14, 904 N.W.2d at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 16, 904 N.W.2d at 39.
Id. ¶ 17.
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EVIDENCE – STATE’S USE OF AN INDEPENDENT EXPERT
APPOINTED UNDER N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 ON BEHALF OF THE
RESPONDENT
In the Matter of Gomez
In the Matter of Gomez94, Joshua Gomez appealed an order of civil
commitment after the court determined he was a sexually dangerous individual.95 In this matter of first impression, Gomez argued it was an error to
allow the State to call an expert appointed on his behalf as a witness.96 Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court order
because Gomez failed to object to the production of expert testimony reports.97
On July 13, 2015, North Dakota sought to have Gomez committed as a
sexually dangerous individual.98 On July 16, 2015, the district court ordered
the North Dakota State Hospital to evaluate Gomez.99 In addition, Gomez,
an indigent party, requested an independent examination.100 After confirming that Gomez was indigent, the district court appointed Dr. Stacey Benson
as an independent examiner.101 In December of 2016, a district court treatment hearing was held and testimony was heard from the following people:
Dr. Benson, the North Dakota State Hospital evaluator, two private evaluators retained by Gomez, and Gomez himself.102
Throughout the discovery process, the State requested that Gomez produce “[a]ny and all reports and tests used by an independent examiner.”103
However, Gomez did not produce a copy of the report or any other information prepared by Dr. Benson.104 More importantly, Gomez did not assert
any objection to the discovery request.105 Prior to the hearing, Gomez filed
the reports prepared by his private evaluators and the State filed the report
of the North Dakota State Hospital evaluator.106 Notably, Mr. Gomez did

94. 2018 ND 16, 906 N.W.2d 87.
95. Gomez, ¶ 1, 906 N.W.2d at 89.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. ¶ 2.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Gomez, ¶ 2, 906 N.W.2d at 89.
102. Id.
103. Id. ¶ 3.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. ¶ 4.
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not file the report of the independent examiner appointed on his behalf, Dr.
Benson.107
Subsequently, the State sought an order for release of Dr. Benson’s report.108 The district court ordered Dr. Benson to release her report, and it
was subsequently filed with the district court.109 At the hearing, the State
called Dr. Benson as a witness.110 Gomez objected, arguing the State was
prohibited from calling Dr. Benson as a witness pursuant to N.D.R.Civ.P.
26(b)(4)(B).111 Additionally, Gomez noted Dr. Benson was appointed pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 and argued that the statute gives him the
option to either call or not call an independent examiner.112 Nonetheless,
the district court ordered Dr. Benson to testify, concluding N.D.C.C. § 2503.3-13 allows for any expert testimony or report to be admissible.113
Dr. Benson diagnosed Gomez with antisocial personality disorder and
noted he had a high risk of reoffending.114 Similarly, the State Hospital
evaluator and one of Gomez’s private evaluators115 concluded Gomez suffered from antisocial personality disorder.116 One of Gomez’s private evaluators testified that Gomez omitted some information during his evaluation
which would have changed his opinion regarding Gomez’s likelihood to
reoffend.117 The other private evaluator Gomez hired, testified he did not
believe Gomez had antisocial personality disorder and that the State failed
to meet its burden.118
On March 29, 2017, the district court entered judgment stating that
Gomez must be committed after determining Gomez was a sexually dangerous individual.119 Gomez appealed the district court’s order, arguing
that the district court erred by ordering Dr. Benson to testify.120
Sexually dangerous individual commitment proceedings are civil proceedings, and, thus, the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure govern.121
107. Gomez, ¶ 4, 906 N.W.2d at 89.
108. Id. ¶ 5.
109. Id.
110. Id. ¶ 6.
111. Id. ¶ 6 (noting N.D.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B) limits the scope of discovery for experts retained for the purpose of trial preparation and who are not intended to be called as a witness.).
112. Id.
113. Gomez, ¶ 6, 906 N.W.2d at 90.
114. Id. ¶ 7.
115. Id. (noting Gomez’s privately retained evaluator diagnosed Gomez with some mild substance use disorders.).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Gomez, ¶ 8, 906 N.W.2d at 90.
120. Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
121. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Matter of Hehn, 2015 ND 218, ¶ 17, 868 N.W.2d 551).
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The district court has discretion when admitting expert testimony, and the
North Dakota Supreme Court will not reverse a decision absent an abuse of
discretion.122 “An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in rendering its decision.”123
Gomez argued the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 precluded the
State from calling an expert who was appointed by the court on behalf of
the respondent.124 The review of a district court’s interpretation of a statute
is de novo.125 N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 provides that “the court shall appoint
a qualified expert to perform an examination or participate in the commitment proceedings on the respondent’s behalf.”126
The North Dakota Supreme Court has previously held an indigent respondent does not have the right to select his/her own independent expert
under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12.127 However, it was an issue of first impression before the North Dakota Supreme Court whether an independent expert appointed pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 should be treated like a
privately retained expert or like a court-appointed expert.128 Gomez argued
an examiner appointed under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 should be treated as a
private expert and subject to the disclosure limitations of N.D.R.Civ.P.
26(b)(4)(B).129 Specifically, the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure limit the scope of discovery for experts prepared for trial preparation and those
not intended to be called to testify.130
The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Gomez in that an independent examiner appointed under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 should be treated
as a private examiner retained by the respondent.131 Specifically, N.D.C.C.
§ 25-03.3-12 provides the respondent an opportunity to retain their own expert, or if they are indigent, the court shall appoint an expert to balance out
North Dakota commitment proceedings which requires the district court to
order an expert evaluation.132 Notably absent from N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12

122. Id. (citing Rittenour v. Gibson, 2003 ND 14, ¶ 29, 656 N.W.2d 691).
123. Id. (quoting Rittenour, ¶ 13, 656 N.W.2d at 695).
124. Id. ¶ 11.
125. Gomez, ¶ 11, 906 N.W.2d at 90 (citing Matter of G.R.H., 2011 ND 21, ¶ 13, 793
N.W.2d 460).
126. Id. ¶ 11, at 91 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-12).
127. Id. ¶ 12 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-12; Matter of Loy, 2015 ND 92, ¶ 13, 862
N.W.2d 500).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.; N.D. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
131. Gomez, ¶ 12, 906 N.W.2d. at 91.
132. Id. ¶ 13.
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is any language that compels the disclosure of an indigent respondent’s expert.133
The district court concluded N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 allows all expert
reports to be admitted into evidence, relying on the language “any testimony and reports of an expert who conducted an examination are admissible.”134 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that this language is meant to avoid the effects of hearsay.135 The North Dakota
Supreme Court stated that construing the language of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.313 in this way would be inconsistent with N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12, which
allows a respondent to retain or have appointed their own expert to perform
an evaluation, and N.D.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B), which allows the retention of
experts for the purpose of trial preparation, but not for testimonial purposes.136 Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court ultimately concluded
“N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 does not eliminate a respondent’s right to retain an
expert for the purpose of trial and potentially be subject to the discovery
limitations provided in N.D.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B).”137
Nonetheless, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district
court decision, stating that Gomez waived his ability to prevent Dr. Benson
from testifying because Gomez failed to object to the State’s discovery request.138 Specifically, the State demanded Gomez produce “any and all reports used by any independent examiner.”139 A request for the production
of documents is governed by N.D.R.Civ.P. 34.140 Moreover, under
N.D.R.Civ.P. 34, Gomez was required to object to any demand that he produce any document.141 Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that
“the failure to serve an objection to an interrogatory or request for production within the thirty-day period prescribed by Rules 33 and 34 constitutes a
waiver.”142
Gomez also argued that his non-disclosure was effectively an objection.143 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, stating that
133. Id. ¶ 14.
134. Id. ¶ 15 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13).
135. Id.
136. Id. ¶ 15, 906 N.W.2d at 92 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13; N.D. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(4)(B)).
137. Gomez, ¶ 16, 906 N.W.2d at 92 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13; N.D. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(4)(B)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing N.D. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B)).
142. Id. (quoting Voracheck v. Citizens State Bank of Lankin, 421 N.W.2d 45, 52 (N.D.
1988)).
143. Gomez, ¶ 17, 906 N.W.2d at 92.
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N.D.R.Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) requires a timely objection and N.D.R.Civ. P. 26
requires a party to take affirmative action when claiming information is
privileged.144 Here, Gomez failed to timely object and failed to comply
with the requirements of N.D.R.Civ.P. 26.145 Therefore, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that Gomez ultimately waived his objection to the admission of Dr. Benson’s testimony and the district court’s order was affirmed.146

144. Id. (citing N.D. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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EVIDENCE – USE OF WITNESS PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
TESTIMONY AND PRIOR STATEMENTS MADE TO AN
OFFICER
State v. Azure
In State v. Azure,147 Duane Azure, Sr. (“Azure”) appealed a criminal
judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of aggravated assault.148
Azure argued the district court had abused its discretion by admitting into
evidence two prior statements of a State’s witness.149 The North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court because the district court abused its discretion in allowing Agent Allen Kluth (“Agent
Kluth”) to testify about the prior statements made by the victim (“the victim”).150
On April 20, 2014, a deputy was sent to Azure’s residence after receiving numerous calls.151 Upon arrival, the deputy discovered the victim lying
on the floor.152 The deputy called an ambulance and the victim was transported to a local emergency room.153 The victim explained to law enforcement and medical personnel that her injuries were caused by a fall.154
However, approximately two weeks later, the victim contacted law enforcement and stated her injuries were not caused by a fall; instead she explained Azure assaulted her.155 The victim was interviewed by Agent Kluth
of the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigation.156 During this interview, the victim restated that Azure assaulted her and, moreover, that she
was afraid to say anything at first.157 Subsequently, Azure was charged
with aggravated assault.158
Azure called the victim as a witness for the preliminary hearing.159 On
direct examination, Azure questioned the victim on the different explanations she gave for her injuries.160 The district court found probable cause

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

2017 ND 195, 899 N.W.2d 294.
Azure, ¶ 1, 899 N.W.2d at 296.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2, 899 N.W.2d at 297.
Id.
Id.
Azure, ¶ 2, 899 N.W.2d at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Azure, ¶ 3, 899 N.W.2d at 297.
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existed and set the case for trial.161 Before Azure’s jury trial, the victim
died from unrelated causes.162
Due to the victim’s death, the State moved to allow the following: (1)
the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony and (2) the victim’s statements
to Agent Kluth.163 Despite Azure’s objections, the district court granted the
State’s motion and the evidence was admitted.164 Subsequently, a jury
found Azure guilty of aggravated assault.165 On appeal, Azure argued the
district court erred in the following ways: (1) allowing the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony into evidence at trial; (2) allowing Agent Kluth to
testify about the victim’s statements made in the hospital; and (3) denying
his motion for judgment of acquittal.166 Under the abuse of discretion
standard, “A district court has broad discretion in evidentiary matters, and
we will not overturn a district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence
unless the court abused its discretion.”167 Therefore, the abuse of discretion
standard applies when reviewing a district court’s evidentiary rulings under
the hearsay rule.168
First, prior to Azure’s trial, the State moved to allow the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony under N.D.R.Ev. 804(b)(1) (“Rule 804”).169
Rule 804 sets out circumstances where hearsay evidence is allowed when
the declarant is unavailable.170 One of those circumstances arises when the
testimony:
[W]as given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition,
whether given during the current proceedings or a different one;
and is now offered against a party who had, or, in a civil case,
whose predecessor in interest had, an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.171
Importantly, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated it is immaterial if
the defendant had significantly less incentive to cross-examine the witness
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. ¶ 4.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Azure, ¶ 5, 899 N.W.2d at 297.
167. Id. ¶ 6 (quoting State v. Vandermeer, 2014 ND 46, ¶ 6, 843 N.W.2d 686 (internal citations omitted)).
168. Id.
169. Id. ¶ 7.
170. Id. ¶ 8 (citing N.D. R. EVID. 804(b)(1)).
171. Id. at 597-98 (citing N.D. R. EVID. 804 (b)(1)).
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at the preliminary examination, so long as the requirements of Rule 804
have been met.172 Essentially, Azure argued he did not have a similar motive.173 Azure argued that at the preliminary hearing his motive was to establish the victim had fabricated her story in an effort to pursue a civil suit
against him.174
The North Dakota Supreme Court ruled Azure’s questioning at the preliminary hearing was to discredit the victim by showing she made inconsistent statements and, moreover, to show that the victim has an ulterior
motive. 175 The Court stated Azure had failed to show how his motivation to
question the victim at trial, if she had, would have been different from his
motive at the preliminary hearing.176 Thus, the Court held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion with regard to this argument.177
The second argument discussed by the North Dakota Supreme Court
was regarding Agent Kluth’s testimony about the victim’s statements to
him.178 The district court allowed the statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
(“Rule 801”).179 Under Rule 801, a statement is not hearsay if it meets the
following conditions:
(1) the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about
a prior statement, and the statement: . . . (B) is consistent with the
declarant’s testimony and is offered; (i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a
recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; or (ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on
another ground.180
The North Dakota Supreme Court framed this issue of first impression
in the following way: whether the declarant must testify at the trial itself,
before the declarant’s prior consistent statements are admissible under Rule
801(d)(1)(B).181

172.
1979)).
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Azure, ¶ 8, 899 N.W.2d at 298 (citing State v. Garvey, 283 N.W.2d 153, 156 (N.D.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Id.
Azure, ¶ 12, 899 N.W.2d at 298.
Id. (citing N.D. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)).
Id. (quoting N.D. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)).
Id. ¶ 13, 899 N.W.2d at 299.
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Due to the identical language of N.D.R.Ev. 801(d)(1)(B) and Fed. R.
Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), the North Dakota Supreme Court considered federal
precedence as persuasive.182 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that
the language of the rule indicates that the declarant’s availability at trial is
required.183 Moreover, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted the majority
of Federal Circuit Courts require that the declarant testify at trial.184 Based
on the circuit court decisions, the language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), and the
Advisory Committee Notes for the Federal Rules of Evidence, the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that the declarant must testify at the trial for
which it is being offered.185 Because the victim did not testify during the
trial, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the district court abused its
discretion in allowing Kluth to testify about statements the victim made. 186
Similarly, N.D.R.Ev. 801(d)(1) requires the opportunity to crossexamine the person who made the statement and this requirement cannot be
satisfied by simply cross-examining someone who heard the statement.187
Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that a district court’s evidentiary error
does not warrant a new trial if the error was harmless.188 Therefore, the
Court considered the entire record and decided in light of all the evidence
that the error was so prejudicial to warrant a new trial.189 The Court specifically reasoned that Agent Kluth’s testimony was not merely cumulative
and included substantially more information than the victim’s preliminary
hearing testimony.190 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
allowing Kluth’s testimony was not harmless.191
Third, and finally, Azure agues the district court abused its discretion
by denying his motion for acquittal.192 Azure argues his conviction should
be reversed due to insufficient evidence.193 The North Dakota Supreme
Court noted:

182. Id. ¶ 14 (citing State v. Randall, 2002 ND 16, ¶ 5, 639 N.W.2d 439).
183. Id. ¶ 17.
184. Azure, ¶ 18, 899 N.W.2d at 299-300 (citing United States v. Frazier, 469 F.3d 85, 88
(3d Cir. 2006); Dillon v. Warden, Ross Correctional Inst., 541 Fed.Appx. 599, 605 (6th Cir.
2013); United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Collicott, 92
F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Piva, 870 F.2d 753, 758 (1st Cir. 1989)).
185. Id. ¶ 19, 899 N.W.2d at 300.
186. Id. ¶ 20.
187. Id. ¶ 21.
188. Id. ¶ 22 (citing City of Grafton v. Wosick, 2013 ND 74, ¶ 12, 830 N.W.2d 550).
189. Id. (citing State v. Doppler, 2013 ND 54, ¶ 21, 828 N.W.2d 502; State v Leinen, 1999
ND 138, ¶ 17, 598 N.W.2d 102).
190. Azure, ¶ 23, 899 N.W.2d at 300-01.
191. Id. ¶ 24, 899 N.W.2d at 301.
192. Id. ¶ 25.
193. Id.
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[a] conviction rests upon insufficient evidence only when, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
and giving the prosecution the benefit of all inferences reasonably
to be drawn in its favor, no rational fact finder could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.194
Moreover, the defendant must show the evidence permits no reasonable inference of guilt.195
Azure argued that without the victim testimony evidence mentioned
and discussed earlier in this case, there was insufficient evidence to support
the conviction.196 However, as previously discussed, the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony was admissible at trial.197 Moreover, there was corroborating testimony from a doctor who testified that the victim’s injuries
were inconsistent with a fall.198 Therefore, this evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, permitted a reasonable inference of
guilt.199 In conclusion, because the district court abused its discretion by
allowing Kluth to testify regarding the victim’s prior statements, and because it was not a harmless error, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed
the judgment and remanded for a new trial.200

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. (citing State v. Putney, 2016 ND 59, ¶ 8, 877 N.W.2d 28 (internal citation omitted)).
Id. (citing State v. Gonzalez, 2000 ND 32, ¶ 14, 606 N.W.2d 873).
Azure, ¶ 27, 899 N.W.2d at 301.
Id.
Id. ¶ 28, 899 N.W.2d at 301-02.
Id. at 302.
Id. ¶ 29.
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MINERAL RIGHTS & WATER LAW – CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Wilkinson v. Board of University and School Lands
In Wilkinson v. Board of University and School Lands,201 successors in
interest to land appealed, and Statoil & Gap, LP (“Statoil”) and EOG Resources, Inc. (“EOG”) cross-appealed, from a district court order granting
the Board of University and School Lands (“Board”) and State Engineer’s
motion for summary judgment determining the Board owns certain property
below the ordinary high watermark of the Missouri River.202 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded203 because the statute that
governed mineral rights of land inundated by certain dams applied retroactively and the district court erroneously made findings on disputed facts.
The Wilkinsons previously acquired title to property located in Williams County.204 In 1958, the Wilkinson’s conveyed surface rights to the
property to the United States for construction and operation of the Garrison
Dam and Reservoir, but reserved oil and gas rights in and under the property.205 In 2012, the Plaintiffs, as successors in interest to the Wilkinsons,
brought an action to determine the ownership of the minerals in and under
the property, alleging they own the mineral interests.206 The plaintiffs also
sued Brigham Oil & Gas, LLP (“Brigham”) and EOG Resources, Inc.
(“EOG”) to determine their rights, alleging Brigham received an oil and gas
lease from the State and EOG from the plaintiffs.207 The plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint adding Statoil Oil & Gas LP (“Statoil”) and XTO Energy, Inc. (“XTO”) as defendants alleging Statoil acquired Brigham and held
an oil and gas lease from the Board.208 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and a declaration regarding the ownership of mineral interests in
property, and alleged a takings claim, deprivation of constitutional rights,
conversion, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.209
In their motion for summary judgment, the Board and State Engineer
(collectively “State”) argued that the State holds title to the bed of the Missouri River up to the current ordinary high watermark and that the disputed
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

2017 ND 231, 903 N.W.2d 51.
Wilkinson, ¶ 1, 904 N.W.2d at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
Id. ¶ 3.
Wilkinson, ¶ 6, 904 N.W.2d at 54.
Id.
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property is located below the current ordinary high watermark.210 Further,
the State argued the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
because the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies, no taking occurred, and that the plaintiffs’ claim for deprivation of constitutional
rights was improper.211 XTO joined the State’s request that the court decide
the State holds title to the disputed minerals.212
In response to the State’s motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs
argued:
[The] property is not part of the State’s sovereign lands, there was
no navigable body of water on the property at the time of statehood, the surface property was purchased by the United States as
part of the Garrison Project, the property was flooded by Lake Sakakawea, the property is located above the historical ordinary high
watermark, and [that] they alleged sufficient facts to support their
takings claim.213
Statoil further argued that the property under Lake Sakakawea is not
sovereign land owned by the State because the lake was man-made, it was
not navigable at the time of statehood, and the property is located outside
Lake Sakakawea and below the current ordinary high watermark of the
Missouri River.214
After the State Engineer intervened, the district court granted Board
and Engineer’s motion for summary judgment.215 On appeal, the North
Dakota Supreme Court considered four issues: whether the district court
correctly determined ownership of the surface estate; whether the statute
that governs mineral rights of land inundated by certain dams applied retroactively; whether successors were entitled to compensation if state-owned
disputed minerals; and whether the district court made findings on disputed
facts.216
The first issue the Supreme Court of North Dakota discussed was the
district’s conclusion that the property interests in dispute are the sovereign
land of the State.217 As the Court noted, the district court decided owner210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. ¶ 7.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8, 903 N.W.2d at 55.
Id. at 54-55.
Wilkinson, ¶ 8, 903 N.W.2d at 55.
Id. ¶¶ 6, 9.
Id. ¶ 13, 903 N.W.2d at 56.
Id. ¶ 11, 903 N.W.2d at 55.
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ship of the surface estate when it granted summary judgment, although the
parties only requested the district court decide ownership of the mineral interests.218 However, when declaratory relief is sought, anyone who has or
claims any interest affected by the declaration must be made a party, and
the declaration may not prejudice the rights of anyone not made a party to
the proceeding.219 Because the Wilkinsons conveyed the surface property to
the United States in 1958, the United States appeared to have an interest in
the property that would be affected by the district court’s declaration that
the State owned both the surface and minerals of the property.220 Thus, because the United States was not a party to this proceeding, the district court
erred in determining ownership of the surface estate.221
Next, the Court considered the district court’s determination that the
State owned the mineral interests at issue.222 After the district court entered
summary judgment and while this case was pending, Chapter 61-33.1223
was enacted into the North Dakota Century Code and governs mineral
rights of land inundated by the Pick-Sloan Missouri Project dams.224 Generally, the Court will apply the law in effect when the cause of action arose;
however, when a law is enacted or amended while an appeal is pending and
it applies retroactively, courts will generally apply the new law.225 Although the proceedings in this case began in 2012, and the district court
granted summary judgment in May 2016, the bill which enacted Chapter
61-33.1 states:
[The chapter] is retroactive to the date of closure of the Pick-Sloan
Missouri basin project dams. The ordinary high water mark determination under this Act is retroactive and applies to all oil and gas
wells spud after January 1, 2006, for purposes of oil and gas mineral and royalty ownership.226
In determining that Chapter 61-33.1 applies retroactively, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota remanded for consideration of whether Chapter 6133.1 applies to the property in this matter since the district court did not

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. ¶ 13.
Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-23-11).
Wilkinson, ¶ 13, 903 N.W.2d at 56 (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1313).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. ¶14.
Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 61-33.1.
Wilkinson, ¶ 14, 903 N.W.2d at 56.
Id. ¶ 17 (citations omitted).
Id. ¶ 19 (citing 2017 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 426, § 4).
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have the opportunity to consider the statutory provisions when deciding
ownership of the disputed minerals.227
The third issue the Court considered was whether the district court
erred in determining the State’s action did not violate the Takings Clauses
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article One,
Section 16 of the North Dakota Constitution.228 As provided by both Constitutions, the State has the power to “take” or “damage” private property
for public use if it compensates the owner for the taking or damage.229 Although the federal government compensated the plaintiffs for the surface
property, they failed to compensate them for the mineral interests.230 The
Supreme Court of North Dakota determined the district court erred in determining there was no taking simply because the plaintiffs were able to
lease the mineral interests numerous times prior to the State claiming ownership.231 In reversing and remanding this issue for prior consideration, the
Court noted the district court must consider the issue on remand if it decides
the State owns the disputed minerals.232
Finally, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered whether the
district court made findings on disputed factual issues as summary judgment is not appropriate if there are genuine issues of material fact.233 Because the parties disputed whether the property at issue was flooded because of the Garrison Project and part of Lake Sakakawea, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota determined the district court erred in making findings on disputed facts and remanded for further proceedings.234
Because the district court could not determine the ownership of the surface estate235 and erroneously made findings on disputed facts236, the Court
reversed and remanded for further proceedings.237 Additionally, because
the statute the governed mineral rights of land inundated by certain dams
applied retroactively, the district court must apply the statute to determine if
the State owns the mineral rights238 and, if the State does own the mineral

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
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237.
238.

Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
Id. ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 22 (citing Irwin v. City of Minot, 2015 ND 60, ¶ 6, 860 N.W.2d 849).
Wilkinson, ¶ 22, 903 N.W.2d at 58.
Id. ¶ 24.
Id. ¶ 25, 903 N.W.2d at 59.
Id. ¶ 26.
Id. ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 13, 903 N.W.2d at 56.
Wilkinson, ¶ 28, 903 N.W.2d at 59.
Id.
Id. ¶ 20, 903 N.W.2d at 58.
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interests, whether the State’s actions constituted a taking in violation of the
North Dakota and United States Constitution.239

239. Id. ¶ 25, 903 N.W.2d at 59.

476

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 93:2

WARRANTLESS URINE TESTS – EXPANDING BIRCHFIELD
State v. Helm
In State v. Helm,240 Steven Helm (“Helm”) was charged with and prosecuted for refusing to submit to a warrantless urine test after being pulled
over for driving under the influence.241 The North Dakota Supreme Court
held that Helm’s refusal to provide a urine sample could not result in a
criminal conviction, because doing so was a violation of Helm’s Fourth
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.242 In doing so, the North Dakota Supreme
Court expanded the United States Supreme Court’s holing in Birchfield v.
North Dakota243 to include warrantless urine tests as an unreasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment.244 Therefore, a defendant in North Dakota
cannot be criminally charged with failing to submit to a warrantless blood
test, under Birchfield, or urine test, under Helm.245
In May 2016, Helm was pulled over for driving without headlights.246
During the stop, Helm was arrested for driving under the influence of a controlled substance.247 Helm refused to submit to a warrantless urine test incident to his lawful arrest.248 The State then charged Helm with refusing to
submit to a chemical test.249 Subsequently, Helm’s motion to dismiss the
refusal charge was granted by the District Court of Cass County.250 The district court found that the warrantless urine test was similar to the warrantless blood test that the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional
in Birchfield, and therefore Helm’s Fourth Amendment right had been violated.251
After Helm’s arrest, the North Dakota Legislature amended Section 3920-01(3)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code to comply with Birchfield by
removing the blood test provision, but left the urine test provision intact.252
240. 2017 ND 207, 901 N.W.2d 57.
241. Helm, ¶ 2, 901 N.W.2d at 58.
242. Id. ¶ 16, 901 N.W.2d at 63.
243. 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (in which the United States Supreme Court consolidated State v.
Birchfield, 2015 ND 6, 858 N.W.2d 302; Beylund v. Levi, 2015 ND 18, 859 N.W.2d 403; and
State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 2015)).
244. Helm, ¶ 16, 901 N.W.2d at 63.
245. Id.
246. Id. ¶ 2, 901 N.W.2d at 58.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Helm, ¶ 3, 901 N.W.2d at 58.
251. Id.
252. Id. ¶ 4, 901 N.W.2d at 58 n.1.
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Section 39-08-01 made it a crime for a driver to refuse to submit to a law
enforcement officer’s request for a chemical test, which, pre-Birchfield, included blood, breath, or urine.253 Section 39-20-01 of the North Dakota
Century Code houses North Dakota’s implied consent statute, stating that
by driving on a North Dakota highway, the driver consents to chemical testing.254 Section 39-20-01(3)(a) specifically authorized a law enforcement
officer to determine which test would be appropriate to administer to the
driver. 255 This section also provided the authority to charge the refusing
driver as though the driver had been driving under the influence.256
The State’s argument on appeal was that the warrantless urine test was
constitutional because it did not require the driver to expose his genitals.257
The State argued that by adopting a requirement that the driver’s genitals
not be exposed, the warrantless urine test would be categorically reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.258 However, the North Dakota Supreme
Court was unpersuaded by this argument.259 Instead, the Court found that
urine tests were searches under the Fourth Amendment.260 The Court further found that searches done without a warrant are per se unreasonable
with only a few limited exceptions.261
The North Dakota Supreme Court also noted that both Helm and Birchfield involved a search incident to a lawful arrest.262 However, Birchfield
was different from Helm because Birchfield explicitly dealt with blood
tests, while Helm was a question of the validity of warrantless urine tests.263
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that Birchfield relied on three factors in assessing the intrusion of privacy that blood and breath tests present.264 The first factor Birchfield relied on was “the extent of the physical
intrusion upon the individual to obtain the evidence.”265 The second factor
was “the extent to which the evidence could be preserved to provide addi253. Id. at 58.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Helm, ¶ 4, 901 N.W.2d at 59 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE 39-20-01(3)(a)).
257. Id. ¶ 5.
258. Id.
259. Id. ¶ 12, 901 N.W.2d at 61.
260. Id. ¶ 6, 901 N.W.2d at 59 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,
613-17, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 665, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1989)).
261. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576
(1967)).
262. Helm, ¶ 7, 901 N.W.2d at 59 (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 217485).
263. Id. at 60 (citing Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184-85).
264. Id. ¶ 8 (citing Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176-78).
265. Id. (citing Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176-78).
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tional, unrelated private information.”266 The third factor was “the extent to
which participation in the search would enhance the embarrassment of the
arrest.”267
Based on those three factors, the United States Supreme Court in
Birchfield reasoned that a breath test was not a significant privacy concern
because once the test was completed, there was no sample left, and the only
fact that could be determined about the driver was the drivers blood alcohol
concentration; and further that a breath test did not enhance embarrassment
beyond the embarrassment inherent in any arrest.268 Alternatively, the Court
in Birchfield found that blood tests implicated privacy concerns, which rose
to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation when administered without a
warrant.269 Under the Birchfield three-factor analysis, the United States
Supreme Court found that piercing the skin to extract part of a driver’s body
is significantly more intrusive than a breath test, and that a blood test can be
preserved and can be used to reveal other private information beyond the
necessary blood alcohol reading required for a conviction of driving under
the influence.270
Finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court looked to Minnesota jurisprudence to address whether warrantless urine tests administered incidental
to a lawful arrest were constitutional, specifically State v. Thompson,271
which addressed the issue within the framework created by Birchfield.272
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Thompson held that warrantless urine
tests were unconstitutional as a search incident to a lawful arrest.273 Specifically, the court in Thompson found that a urine test was similar to a breath
test regarding the physical intrusion on the driver’s body.274 However, the
Thompson Court also found that a urine test was similar to a blood test because both could be preserved and used to obtain facts about the driver beyond the necessary blood alcohol concentration.275 The Thompson Court
also found that there was a significant privacy violation because of the embarrassment that a driver being observed “void[ing] directly into [a] bot-

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. (citing Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176-78).
Id.
Helm, ¶ 8, 901 N.W.2d at 60 (citing Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176-78).
Id. (citing Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178).
Id. (citing Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178-79).
886 N.W.2d 224, 230-33 (Minn. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1338 (2017).
Helm, ¶ 10, 901 N.W.2d at 60.
Id. (citing Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 230-33).
Id. (citing Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 230).
Id. (citing Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 230-31).
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tle”276 could cause.277 Therefore, the Thompson Court held that a driver
who refuses to submit to a warrantless urine test, although incident to a lawful arrest, could not be convicted for refusing to submit to a warrantless
urine test.278
In Helm, the State argued that Helm was not under the influence of alcohol at the time of his arrest, making his case distinguishable from Thompson.279 Rather, the State contended that because Helm was under the influence of drugs, there was no less intrusive test than a urine test.280 Finally,
the State argued that by adopting a categorical rule for urine collection not
requiring a law enforcement officer to see the driver’s genitals, no Fourth
Amendment violation would occur.281 Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court was not persuaded by the State’s final argument.282
Instead, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that the categorical
approach favored by the State did not meet the minimum standards set out
by the United States Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association283 or Notational Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab,284 because the State’s approach was a case-by-case analysis left to an
officer’s discretion and lacked guidelines or instructions for officer’s visual
observations.285 The North Dakota Supreme Court also found that the
Fourth Amendment is not only concerned with the privacy concern associated with visual observation of a driver providing the urine sample, it is also
concerned with the driver being forced to urinate in the presence of a law
enforcement officer.286 Finally, the Court found that the State made no effort to explain how its categorical rule would alleviate the privacy concerns
dealing with the preservation of the urine sample and the information that
could be obtained from it.287 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court
declined to adopt the State’s proposed rule for urine testing incident to a
lawful arrest.288
276. Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Forensic Sci. Lab., Urine Collection Kit Instructions
for
Arresting
Officer (2011), https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/bca/ bca-divisions/forensicscience/Documents/Urine%20Specimen%20Collection%20Instructions.pdf.
277. Helm, ¶ 10, 901 N.W.2d at 60-61 (citing Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 231-32).
278. Id. ¶ 11, 901 N.W.2d at 61 (citing Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 233-34).
279. Id. ¶ 12.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. 489 U.S. 602, 621-24.
284. 489 U.S. 656, 661-62.
285. Helm, ¶ 15, 901 N.W.2d at 63.
286. Id.
287. Id. (citing Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 231).
288. Id.
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Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Minnesota
Supreme Court precedent and upheld Helm’s motion to dismiss.289 The
Court specifically held that the government cannot prosecute a driver for
refusing to submit to a warrantless urine test.290 Therefore, the district court
did not err when it dismissed the charge against Helm for refusing to submit
to a warrantless urine test.291

289. Id. ¶ 16.
290. Id.
291. Helm, ¶ 16, 901 N.W.2d at 63.

